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ABSTRACT
Moral life often presents us with trade-offs between the sufferings of 
some individuals and the sufferings of others. Researchers may need 
to consider, for example, whether the suffering imposed on animals 
by a certain line of medical experimentation justifies the relief that 
the resulting discoveries may bring to (human or non-human) others. 
Often in such cases, the suffering of some individuals is incompa-
rable with—that is neither greater than nor less than nor equal to—
the suffering of others. While this complicates moral decision-making 
across species, it does not undermine it.
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Moral life often presents us with trade-offs between the 
sufferings of some individuals and the sufferings of others. 
Researchers may need to consider, for example, whether the 
suffering imposed on animals by a certain line of medical ex-
perimentation justifies the relief that the resulting discoveries 
may bring to (human or non-human) others. This paper aims to 
show that often in such cases, the suffering of some individuals 
is incomparable with—that is neither greater than nor less than 
nor equal to—the suffering of others. I suggest, further, that 
while this complicates moral decision-making across species, 
it does not undermine it.
Comparisons Involving a Single Individual 
Decisions involving many individuals, such as the research 
case just mentioned, tend to obscure the problem of incompa-
rability. Thus, to avoid introducing too many complications 
at once, I will begin with simpler cases. The problem is most 
straightforwardly grasped in cases involving just two instances 
of suffering—and, most particularly, in cases involving two in-
comparable instances of suffering that are experienced by the 
same person. 
To say that such instances are incomparable doesn’t mean 
simply that we don’t know how to compare the two—that, in 
other words, we have no very accurate methods of assessing the 
degree of the suffering. That, of course, is true. But the problem 
of incomparability is deeper. It is that sometimes one instance 
of suffering is in fact overall neither greater than, nor less than, 
nor equal to, another. This problem would persist even if we did 
have precise means of assessment. 
This use of the term ‘incomparable’ follows that of Carl-
son (2008). It is also common in the mathematical literature. 
John Nolt
88
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
Yet, philosophical usage is inconsistent. Sometimes the terms 
‘incommensurable’, ‘indeterminate’ or ‘nonstandard’ are used 
instead. Chang (2002) describes values as incomparable only 
if no positive value relation holds between them. Because she 
thinks that pairs of values may be “on a par” (a positive value 
relation) even if neither is greater than or equal to the other, her 
notion of incomparability is stricter than the one used here. For 
a helpful introduction to the notion, see Hsieh (2007). 
A prime source of incomparability is suffering’s qualitative 
complexity. Having experienced various forms of suffering 
ourselves, we are able to rank the intensity of some of them. 
We may, for example, prefer the mild nausea induced by an 
analgesic to the migraine headache that it relieves. But in other 
cases we may not be able to choose. Is it better, for example, 
to live for months in grief and mortal terror under a murderous 
military siege or to live for a similar time with severe burns? 
Even those who have experienced both may be unable to de-
cide. The experiences are just too different. 
Part of what bewilders judgment in such cases is that suffer-
ing is qualitatively multidimensional. Some forms of suffering 
(e.g., depression, anxiety or grief) are primarily emotional and 
non-localized—that is, diffused throughout experiential space. 
Others (e.g., abdominal cramps, migraine headache, and the 
constant ache of arthritis) are locally painful. Still others are 
spatially diffuse, like emotion, yet qualitatively more akin to 
pain; generalized nausea or the malaise of fever are, perhaps, 
examples. 
The various dimensions along which different forms of suf-
fering can be compared make overall comparison not only 
difficult, but probably to some degree arbitrary. Living under 
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siege, for example, may be worse along the “emotional” di-
mension, while enduring severe burns is worse on the “physical 
pain” dimension. If so, each form of suffering is greater along 
one dimension and less along another. To reach an overall com-
parative judgment, then, we must know how much “weight” to 
give each of these dimensions. But it is not clear that there is 
some single non-arbitrary weighting scheme. If there are many 
possible weighting schemes, some of which make living un-
der siege worse and some of which make the burns worse, and 
none of these schemes is objectively right, then, overall, the 
two instances of suffering are incomparable. Our inability to 
rank the experiences reflects a factual indeterminacy.
One might suppose that our inability to rank diverse experi-
ences of suffering simply shows that we are indifferent between 
them, and hence that they are equal. But this is a mistake. For, 
if they were equal, then a small increase or decrease in one 
(keeping the other unchanged) would make them unequal. But 
often such small increases or decreases do not affect our rank-
ing. If we cannot decide whether months of suffering from se-
rious burns is better or worse than months of grief and terror 
under siege, then we will probably still not be able to decide 
between the burns and a few days more under siege. The ex-
tra days clearly make living under siege worse than it would 
have been without them. But they need not make living under 
the siege worse than living with the burns, as they must if liv-
ing under siege without these extra days and living with the 
burns are equally bad. (Readers familiar with the literature on 
incomparability will recognize this reasoning as a version of 
the “small-improvement argument”—though the present case 
concerns a deterioration of the situation, not an improvement. 
See Chang (2002), sec. I.)
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Now it might be objected that someday researchers may find 
some behavioral or neuropsychological quantity that enables 
them to decide by direct measurement what we can’t decide by 
subjective comparison—say, that the grief and terror of living 
under siege is equal to a certain level of suffering from burns 
(assuming a fixed time period for both). But what would the 
equality of two such measurements represent? If the measure-
ments were calibrated by subjective reports or by behavioral re-
sponses, a judgment of equality might represent nothing more 
than the individual’s indecision. But, as we just saw, indecision 
between two forms of suffering does not guarantee their equal-
ity. It could reflect incomparability resulting from assessments 
that point in different directions along different qualitative di-
mensions of the suffering. In that case, it would be a mistake to 
suppose that our measurement represented some factual over-
all degree of suffering which happens, in the two instances in 
question, to be equal. The measured equality would simply be 
an artifact of the measurement. The measurement is meant to 
give us an objective scale on which every overall degree of 
suffering is less than or greater than or equal to every other. 
But there may be little reason to think that such a scale must 
correspond neatly to anything in brain functioning or human 
experience.
Cross-Species Comparisons
There is even less reason to believe in such an objective 
ranking for comparisons of the sufferings of different individ-
uals, and less reason still if those individuals are of different 
species. Let’s try to imagine what would be involved in accu-
rately calibrating measurements across species whose nervous 
systems and behavioral responses vary widely. How could we 
tell, for example, whether the suffering of a deer with extensive 
and severe burns from a forest fire is greater than or less than or 
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equal to the suffering of an uninjured human who experiences 
the grief and terror of living under siege for a similar period 
of time? Given the disparities between these two cases (not to 
mention the possibility that deer may suffer in ways that hu-
mans don’t and vice versa) there may well be nothing in which 
the equality of the suffering of these two individuals, or the 
greater intensity of the suffering of one of them, could consist. 
The two kinds of suffering may just be different in a way that 
precludes factual total rank ordering. They may be, in a word, 
incomparable.
Incomparability is magnified when we vary not only the in-
tensity of the suffering in various dimensions but also its du-
ration. Suppose for the sake of argument that, contrary to the 
claims of the previous paragraph, we can combine the various 
qualitative dimensions of suffering into a single linear scale of 
overall intensity. Still, when we consider duration as well (as 
we must, because it too contributes to overall suffering), we 
are, once again, dealing with two distinct scales. To estimate 
the overall suffering we must now decide how each contributes 
to it. With a single human individual this is often possible. I, for 
example, might prefer great suffering of brief duration to lesser 
suffering of longer duration. But others would weigh duration 
more in comparison to intensity, still others would weigh it 
less; and some might weigh its relative contribution differently 
at different times. Clearly, even among humans, there are many 
possible weighting schemes. 
These are likely to proliferate in cross-species comparisons. 
How, for example, given likely differences in time perception 
among animals of different species, are we to select a single 
species-sensitive weighting scheme that accurately reflects the 
contributions of both intensity and duration to total suffering? 
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The range of possible weighting schemes is very wide. There 
seems to be no good reason to believe that in each case exactly 
one of these yields the “true” total. Indeed, that nature should 
so arrange itself is exorbitantly improbable. Thus any a priori 
tendency we may have to suppose that there must be a unique-
ly true weighting scheme is likely to be product of failure of 
imagination or wishful thinking. And there is, so far as I can 
tell, not much, if any, empirical evidence for this belief. Thus, 
once again, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, in some 
cases, the overall suffering of one animal on a given occasion, 
considering both its intensity and duration, is in fact neither 
worse than nor better than nor equal to the suffering of another 
animal on another occasion. It is just different.
The existence of incomparability does not imply, of course, 
that comparisons across species, even when they involve both 
intensity and duration, are always impossible. The agony and 
emotional distress of a human slowly dying of bone cancer, for 
example, is undoubtedly worse than a raccoon’s suffering from 
a painful bite wound. It is worse because it is worse along most 
or all relevant dimensions; the pain alone is probably more se-
vere and (let us assume) longer lasting, and it is accompanied 
by multiple forms of intense emotional misery that are likely 
absent in the case of the raccoon. Thus, for some pair-wise 
comparisons, ranking of suffering across species is possible. 
But for others, as I have argued, neither instance of suffering is 
greater than nor less than nor equal to the other. In mathemati-
cal terms, I am claiming that degrees of suffering among ani-
mals (both human and nonhuman) are partially, but not linearly, 
ordered. They cannot all be arranged on the same linear scale.
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Parity
Ruth Chang has suggested that when quantities are incom-
parable in this sense they may nevertheless be comparable in 
different way—a kind of rough equality that she calls “being on 
a par” or “parity.” Yet although much has been written regard-
ing Chang’s concept of parity over the last decade and a half, 
it remains dauntingly obscure. Various analyses have been of-
fered, but all have problems. None (so far as I know) has found 
practical application, and none is widely accepted. (For a recent 
but unsuccessful attempt to analyze the concept, see Carlson 
(2010).)
Since the literature on parity is often technical, a detailed 
discussion of the concept’s difficulties is out of place here. I 
will mention only one disappointing feature that infects all ver-
sions: intransitivity. Suppose, as in the example above, that for 
a single individual the sufferings of (A) being under siege for 
a certain time period and  (B) extensive burns for a comparable 
period are on a par. As we saw above, the suffering of (A+) be-
ing under siege for a few more days (or hours, or even minutes) 
may also be on a par with (B). So (A) is on a par with (B) and 
(B) is on a par with (A+), but (A+) is not on a par with (A), 
since it is straightforwardly worse than (A). That pattern is the 
intransitivity of parity. Because parity is intransitive, its logic 
is much weaker than the logic of equality; there is, therefore, 
comparatively little that one can usefully do with the concept.
In sum, efforts to develop an alternative notion of com-
parability that we might employ in comparisons of suffering 
across species have so far not achieved notable success. While 
it seems unlikely that we will ever find a single justifiable no-
tion of parity that will simplify comparison by allowing us to 
treat incomparable forms of suffering as equal, I do think that 
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over time we can adjust our moral thinking to the complexity 
of comparative animal experience. For while incomparability 
exists, it is limited—and there are ways of working around it. 
Bounded Incomparability
Consider, for instance, a wolf’s mild but annoying flea in-
festation and a large, painful suppurating wound in the paw of 
a mountain lion. If these are of equal duration, then (assum-
ing the time sense of a mountain lion is not too different from 
the time sense of a wolf) it seems likely that the suffering of 
the mountain lion is greater. If we imagine the mountain lion’s 
wound to be of even greater duration, then the difference is 
greater still. If the wound heals more quickly, by contrast, or 
the fleas plague the wolf for a longer time, then the difference 
in total suffering is less. If the mountain lion’s wound is quite 
minor and heals yet more quickly, and the wolf’s fleas are truly 
awful and last still longer, then the wolf suffers more. But there 
is no compelling reason to think that as the duration and inten-
sity of the two forms of suffering are varied continuously in 
this way, there is necessarily some point, between clear cases 
in which the mountain lion’s suffering is worse and clear cases 
in which the wolf’s suffering is worse, at which the total suf-
fering of the two animals is equal. It is logically possible—in-
deed, quite likely, I think—that the suffering of the two animals 
in some or all of the intermediate cases is incomparable. Such 
incomparability could result either from the qualitative differ-
ences between the two forms of suffering or the indeterminacy 
of the relative weighting of intensity and duration, or both.
Regardless of the source, the noteworthy point is that the 
incomparability is bounded—that is, confined within a certain 
range. The diagram below indicates how relationships of com-
parative suffering might be arranged among cases like those 
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just mentioned. A line or series of lines connecting a higher 
point down to a lower one indicates that the degree of suffering 
represented by the higher point is greater than the degree of suf-
fering represented by the lower; points unconnected in this way 
represent mutually incomparable degrees of suffering. (Math-
ematicians call this a Hasse diagram for a partially ordered set. 
See Trotter (1992, 5)). 
The diagram represents the suffering of the mountain lion 
with a severely wounded paw and awful fleas as worse than that 
of the wolf with awful fleas, which in turn is worse than that 
of the wolf with a moderate case of fleas, and so on. (I am not, 
of course, claiming that the diagram is empirically correct; its 
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purpose is merely illustrative.) While some degrees of suffering 
(e.g., the suffering of the wolf with awful fleas and the suffering 
of the mountain lion with a severely wounded paw) are repre-
sented here as incomparable with one another, all the degrees 
represented are bounded by extreme cases. All are less than 
or equal to the suffering of the mountain lion with a severely 
wounded paw and awful fleas, and all are greater than or equal 
to the suffering of the completely healthy wolf (which, presum-
ably, is not suffering at all). Such bounds are often available, 
so that it is often possible to specify a range within which in-
comparable degrees of suffering lie. So, for example, according 
to the diagram, while (a) the suffering of the wolf with awful 
fleas and (b) the suffering of the mountain lion with a severe-
ly wounded paw are incomparable with one another, they are 
bounded by above by the suffering of the mountain lion with a 
severely wounded paw and awful fleas and below by the suffer-
ing of the wolf with a moderate case of fleas. We may thus infer 
that any suffering greater than or equal to the suffering of the 
mountain lion with a wounded paw and awful fleas is greater 
than both (a) and (b), and any suffering less than or equal to 
that of the wolf with a moderate case of fleas is less than both 
(a) and (b). Thus, though (a) and (b) are incomparable with one 
another, we can still obtain a relatively sharp idea of how they 
both fit into the range of degrees of suffering generally. There 
is, in other words, much to which we can compare them both. 
Incomparability and Equality Principles
Even so, incomparability complicates moral thinking. Many 
animal ethicists, for example, among them Peter Singer (2009, 
ch. 1) and David DeGrazia (1996, ch. 3) assume equality prin-
ciples, according to which a given quantity of suffering has the 
same moral importance whether it occurs in a human or a non-
human. Such principles tacitly require not only equal consider-
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ation for equal suffering but greater consideration for greater 
suffering. But how should moral consideration be apportioned 
when one instance of suffering is incomparable with another? 
The most obvious answer—giving equal consideration to in-
comparable degrees of suffering—won’t do, for reasons similar 
to those which vitiate Chang’s notion of parity. Consider again 
the diagram above. The suffering of the lion with a paw that is 
slightly wounded and heals quickly is incomparable with (c) 
the suffering of the wolf with a moderate case of fleas, and 
also with (d) the suffering of the wolf with a minor case of 
fleas. If we gave it the same consideration as (c) and the same 
consideration as (d), then we would have to give (c) and (d) 
the same consideration. But (c) deserves more consideration, 
according to the equality principle. Hence we can’t, on pain of 
inconsistency, simply add to equality principles the stipulation 
that incomparable cases deserve equal consideration too. 
I will not attempt here to formulate a consistent principle of 
moral consideration that is applicable even to cases involving 
incomparable values. But such a principle is pretty clearly not 
out of the question. Where two or more degrees of suffering are 
incomparable, it could, for example, use evident bounds of this 
incomparability to fix limits on the range of moral consider-
ation appropriate for those degrees of suffering.
Aggregating Suffering 
We have so far intentionally bypassed yet another source of 
incomparability: aggregation of the sufferings of many individ-
uals. When we consider suffering borne not by just one animal 
but by many, each instance adds to the total. If, for example, 7 
billion chickens suffer annually as a result of their confinement 
and slaughter in factory poultry operations, and if, for simplic-
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ity’s sake, we assume that each suffers equally, then the total is 
7 billion times the suffering of just one chicken. 
Incomparability has not so far entered the picture. But it 
does enter if we try to make certain kinds of cross-species com-
parisons. To see this, I beg the reader to bear with me through 
an artificially simple (though still, I fear, somewhat tedious) 
thought experiment. The intended payoff should be not only an 
explanation of how aggregation itself can produce incompara-
bility, but also a better sense of the significance of incompara-
bility for moral theory. 
Suppose that something like 300 million Americans eat the 
7 billion chickens just mentioned. Call this circumstance the 
current scenario. And compare it with an admittedly unreal-
istic vegetarian scenario in which chicken is not industrially 
produced and, indeed, not eaten at all. Suppose that each of the 
300 million Americans would, under the vegetarian scenario, 
suffer to a certain degree from the absence of chicken. How 
much they would suffer depends on how we fill in the details. 
If, to take one extreme, we suppose that the industrial chick-
en operations are eliminated and replaced with nothing, then 
the suffering, both from unemployment and hunger would be 
considerable. If, at the other extreme, we suppose that chicken 
meat is replaced by a vegetable product that costs the same 
and tastes the same and whose manufacture employs all those 
formerly employed in the chicken industry under similar (or 
better) working conditions and at the same wages, then, while 
there might still be discontent, the change would result in little 
actual suffering. 
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Suppose that the amount of human suffering in the vegetar-
ian scenario is somewhere between these extremes—an annual 
per capita suffering of degree X. Then it may be that: 
(A1) The suffering of one human to degree X in the 
vegetarian scenario is less than the suffering of each 
chicken under the current scenario. 
If (A1) holds, then since there are 7 billion chickens and only 
300 million humans, the total suffering of the chickens is much 
greater in the current scenario than the total suffering of the 
humans in the vegetarian scenario. 
Suppose, however, that suffering of level X is incomparable 
with the suffering of each chicken in the current scenario. Then 
there are two possibilities: 
(B1) If the incomparability is relatively narrow, the 
fact that there are so many more chickens might still 
make the suffering of the chickens in the current sce-
nario greater than the suffering of the humans in the 
vegetarian scenario, or 
(B2) If the incomparability is wide, the suffering of the 
7 billion chickens in the current scenario might in total 
be incomparable with 300 million times X. 
Or, again, it may be that suffering of degree X is greater than 
the suffering of each chicken in the current scenario. Then there 
are three possibilities: 
(C1) Suffering of degree X is greater than or equal to 
23⅓ times the suffering of each chicken in the cur-
rent scenario, so that the suffering of the 300 million 
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Americans in the vegetarian scenario is greater than or 
equal to the suffering of the 7 billion chickens under 
the current scenario, 
(C2) Suffering of degree X is less than 23⅓ times the 
suffering of each chicken in the current scenario, so 
that, given the greater number of chickens, the suffer-
ing of the chickens in the current scenario is greater 
than the suffering of the humans in the vegetarian sce-
nario, or
(C3) Suffering of degree X is incomparable with 23⅓ 
times the suffering of each chicken, so that even though 
the suffering of each human in the vegetarian scenario 
is greater than the suffering of each chicken in the cur-
rent scenario, the total suffering of the chickens in the 
current scenario is incomparable with the total suffer-
ing of the humans in the vegetarian scenario.
(Incidentally, my use of the number 23⅓ is a bit facetious. I 
don’t intend to suggest that such precision is really possible.) 
Case (C3) is noteworthy in that it shows how, even if the suf-
fering of each chicken under the current scenario is comparable 
with the suffering of each human under the vegetarian scenario, 
the total suffering of the chickens in the current scenario may 
be incomparable with the total suffering of the humans in the 
vegetarian scenario. In (C3), in other words, though the suffer-
ings of members of the populations are comparable individu-
ally, they are not comparable in aggregate. It is in this sense that 
aggregation itself can be a source of incomparability. In (B2), 
by contrast, though the two populations are likewise incom-
parable in aggregate, this incomparability arises from the fact 
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that they are incomparable individually. Here the aggregation 
merely preserves this already existing incomparability.
Aggregation, Incomparability and Ethics
As was noted above, the occurrence of incomparability 
in the case of comparisons of just two instances of suffering 
demonstrates the inadequacy of current formulations of equal-
ity principles—the very principles which for consequential-
ists like Singer, apportion moral consideration. Incomparabil-
ity resulting from aggregation demonstrates the same thing. It 
adds, moreover, a novel complication: since aggregation is a 
kind of summation, how are we to make sense of sums involv-
ing incomparable quantities? Fortunately, that complication is 
merely technical, and it has a satisfactory solution (see Carlson 
2008)—though one too abstruse to go into here. 
To some extent Peter Singer himself noticed the general dif-
ficulty long ago and saw that it is not insurmountable:
It may be objected that comparisons of the sufferings 
of different species are impossible to make and that for 
this reason when the interests of animals and humans 
clash the principle of equality gives no guidance. It is 
probably true that comparisons of suffering between 
members of different species cannot be made precisely, 
but precision is not essential. Even if we were to pre-
vent the infliction of suffering on animals only when it 
is quite certain that the interests of humans will not be 
affected to anything like the extent that animals are af-
fected, we would be forced to make radical changes in 
our treatment of animals … (Singer 2002, 16-17)
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I have argued that the lack of precision is due not merely to a 
lack of techniques to make the comparison, but also, in many 
cases, to the incomparability of the sufferings themselves. Yet 
it is also apparent that, despite the threat of incomparability, 
Singer is right that in some cases “the interests of humans will 
not be affected to anything like the extent that animals are af-
fected.” 
Three such cases are illustrated in the example of the previ-
ous section: (A1), (B1) and (C2). (A1), the most straightfor-
ward, is perhaps the sort of case that Singer had in mind. In this 
case, the suffering of each individual chicken is worse than the 
suffering of each individual human; and, since there are more 
chickens, the total suffering of the chickens is indisputably 
greater. But greater total suffering of the chickens is not ruled 
out even if, as in (B1), the sufferings of individual chickens 
and humans are incomparable; for in (B1) the incomparability 
is narrow enough so that the greater number of chickens pre-
dominates. Similarly, in (C2) the suffering of each individual 
human is worse than the suffering of each individual chicken, 
but the greater number of the chickens suffices, once again, to 
make the total suffering of the chickens greater.
Note also that cases such as (B2) and (C3), in which aggre-
gate suffering in one scenario is incomparable with aggregate 
suffering in another, illustrate once again the inapplicability 
of standard equality principles. As was explained above, it is 
wrong to regard the sufferings of the two scenarios in (B2) or 
of the two scenarios in (C3) as equal. Some more nuanced ap-
proach is approach is required.
Still, it might be objected that, however important incompa-
rability is for consequentialists, it is of no concern for theories 
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that do not rely on this sort of aggregation. Tom Regan, for 
example, famously argues that moral concern should center on 
the degree of harm to individuals, and that where harms are 
unequal “numbers don’t count.” Thus, given a choice between 
inflicting a given level of suffering to each of many innocent 
individuals and slightly greater level of suffering to just one, 
Regan thinks we should choose the former (2004, 308). This is 
because in Regan’s theory right action is determined by rights-
based rules, not by the best aggregate outcome. 
Still, Regan concedes this much to the consequentialists: that 
in cases in which all would suffer equally, numbers do count; 
that is, in a forced choice, we should inflict suffering on the few 
rather than on the many (2004, 305). But now (the astute reader 
has seen this coming) what if the suffering of some of these 
individuals is not equal to but rather incomparable with the suf-
fering of the others? Do numbers count then? Regan, of course, 
has no answer. But, to be fair, no prominent animal ethicist has 
attended to such questions. Yet, as I have argued, incomparabil-
ity is to be expected in cross-species comparisons. It is time to 
give it the attention it deserves.
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